Abstract Multi-server 
Introduction
User authentication is used to authenticate a legitimate user through an insecure channel. According to the use environment, user authentication can be divided into user authentication in single-server environments and user authentication in multi-server environments. For user authentication in multi-server environments, users can register at a registration center to access a server that is associated with the registration center. Many user authentication schemes have been proposed for multi-server environments [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
In 2009, Hsiang and Shih proposed a secure dynamic-ID-based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments [7] . They claimed that their scheme is secure and more efficient than Liao and Wang's scheme. Unfortunately, Lee, et al., pointed out that Hsiang and Shih's scheme is vulnerable to masquerade attacks and server spoofing attacks, is not easily reparable, and cannot provide mutual authentication [8] . To solve these problems, Lee, et al., proposed an improvement to Hsiang and Shih's scheme. Recently, Li, et al., showed that Lee, et al.'s scheme does not provide authentication and is vulnerable to forgery attacks and server spoofing attacks [9] . In addition, Li et al., proposed a new scheme based on Lee, et al.'s scheme. However, their scheme is vulnerable to forgery attacks and replay attacks. In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of Li, et al.'s dynamic-ID-based remote user authentication scheme and then we propose a security enhanced dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments.
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 describes a brief review of Li, et al.'s scheme, and Section 3 analyze the security vulnerabilities of Li et al.'s scheme. In Section 4, we propose a security enhanced dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. In Section 5, we analyze our proposed scheme of the security requirements and performance. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusion. is the identity of the server.
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The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose security enhanced dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Registration center RC selects the master secret key x and a secret number y , computes
and then shares them with server j S though a secure channel. This scheme consists of four phases: registration phase, login phase, verification phase, and password change phase. Table 1 shows the notation used describe our proposed scheme.
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Performance Analysis
Figure 4. Analysis of Time According To Number of Users
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Conclusions
In this paper, we examined the security vulnerabilities of Li, et al.'s scheme and proposed a security enhanced dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Our scheme provides mutual authentication and key establishment between user and server. In addition, our scheme has been proved that security to various attacks. Although our scheme incurs a little more computational costs than Lee 
